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 Industrial structure and preferences for a common currency  
The case of the EURO referendum in Sweden  
 
Abstract: Attitudes for a common currency differ from nation to nation, or from region to 
region. We analyze regionally differing voting results of a referendum held in 
Sweden in lieu of joining the European Monetary Union. We put a special 
focus on the role of the industrial mix – being a potential factor influencing 
heterogeneous transmission – and find a significant, but subordinated, impact 
on voting behavior. 
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I. Introduction 
Differing attitudes across nations on the desirability of currency unions may depend on 
national economic conditions. Nations with a large share of export-intensive industries may 
benefit from reduced transaction costs, lower risk associated with transnational investment, 
and lowered exchange rate volatility. Nations with a larger concentration of small firms, 
which are potentially more dependent on conventional bank loans, may benefit from 
smoothened monetary variations (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993). The national industry’s 
sensitivity to monetary shocks and the integration of its industry with other regions of the 
currency union may play a role. For example, fixed investment and construction are sensitive 
to changes in interest rates (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) while services tend to be relatively 
independent of large amounts of foreign capital. A difference between some sectors such as 
e.g., construction and other interest-sensitive sectors, however, lies in the lower degree of 
integration with foreign economies. Since the effects of interest sensitivity and integration 
may run counter to each other for some sectors, clear-cut expectations do not exist for all 
sectors, making the impact of the respective sectors an empirical issue.  
We approach the influence of the industrial mix on the regionally diverse attitudes to joining 
a monetary union by investigating the 2003 public referenda where Swedish voters were 
asked whether their countries should join the EMU: 55.9% of the voters opted for the no-
alternative, and the turnout was 82.6%.  
We integrate our test of the importance of the industrial structure into a general analysis 
which provides evidence of a range of other socio-economic, demographic and political as 
well as spatial variables. Our analysis adds to the debate on the economic efficiency of 
currency unions. It also contributes to the literature analyzing public referenda and processes 
 of direct democracy (e.g., Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2015) and to the literature of the 
heterogeneous effects of homogeneous monetary policies that analyzes on the basis of VAR 
models (Carlino and DeFina, 1998).  
II. Empirical strategy and data 
 
We follow the public choice literature, employ aggregated data, and as a first step investigate 
the voting outcome by using OLS regressions (Coates and Humphreys, 2006) 
.
  (1) 
where pcvi is the percentage share of “no” votes of the municipality i, sn is the relevance of 
sector n at the voter’s place of work, and xm are attributes that influence idiosyncratic 
preferences and other regional particularities. The regional importance of a sector is captured 
by its proportion at total employment. α, βn and γm are parameters, and ω is an error term.  
The set of variables xm includes the dummy variable urban that defines areas with more than 
150 residents per km2 in order to test for the effects of urbanization, and the regional rate of 
unemployment. It also includes the average age of the population as currencies may be 
experience goods and the Swedish currency may be associated with a relative stability. We 
include the proportions of votes of the Green Party, the Centre Party, and the Left Party 
opposing the EMU in the preceding 2002 Riksdag elections (no-parties) as a control for 
political preferences.  
We include a dummy border denoting regions bordering another EU country or the Baltic 
Sea to control for any disproportional benefits of border regions from European integration. 
As an indicator of remoteness we consider the distance to the headquarters of the ECB in 
Frankfurt, Germany (distECB). In order to control for within-country centrality, a market 
potential in the Harris (1954) tradition is employed that for each municipality is the aggregate 
of the GDP in all Swedish regions weigted by the distance. We use a standard internal 
in m mimnini
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 distance measure to account for a region’s self-potential (Redding and Venables, 2004) and 
set the negative exponential decay parameter to 0.012 following a grid search that targets the 
standard information criteria.  
In order to control for cross commuting we use the proportion of distance-weighted 
employment within a sector at distance-weighted total employment with a negative 
exponential discount parameter of 0.1, in line with Ahlfeldt (2011) and the empirical 
observation that only a small fraction of people commute at distances larger than 50km 
(Öhman and Lindgren, 2003).  
Data were obtained from the Statistika centralbyrån of Sweden. Sweden is divided into 21 
‘Län’ or counties which are subdivided into 290 municipalities.  
The share of “no-votes” varies between 24%–87%. Figure 1 depicts a north-south 
heterogeneity and a reduction in the share of “no-votes” along the eastern border areas. 
 
III. Results 
To correct for heteroscedasticity, variables are weighted by the inverse of the square root of 
the variance of the error term εi. The empirical results corresponding to specification (1) are 
presented in Table 2, column (1). We report unstandardized coefficients (first row), the 
standardized (“beta-“) coefficients (italics, second row), and the standard errors (in 
parentheses, third row). Beta-coefficients suggest that the fraction of supporters of No-EMU-
parties has the largest impact on the share “no-votes.” A 1% increase of the fraction of 
supporters of No-EMU-parties increases no-votes against the EURO by more than 0.7%. 
Given the difference in “No Party supporters” between the least supportive region and the 
most supportive region of more than 26 percentage point (Table 1) this estimate implies large 
quantitative effects on the voting outcome. Market potential has a negative impact on the 
share of no-votes and is of second-largest influence, leading to an 11.3% voting variation 
 between the regions with the smallest and the largest market potential. The share of “no-
votes” increased by about 0.7 percentage points for every 100km increase in distance from the 
ECB, supporting the impression from Figure 1.  
A strong regional construction sector has a positive but subordinated impact on the share of 
“no-votes”: The no-vote variation between the region with the largest and the lowest 
construction sector shares is at some 4.3%. Similarly, the interest-sensitive sector wholesale 
and retailing (G50–52) has a significant negative impact, but the effect is even more limited 
(3.9%). The only exception to this limited relevance of sectoral structure consists of the “other 
services” sector, implying a variation between the regions of some 9.8%. 
In column 2, shares of employment refer to distance-weighted employment, including 
neighboring municipalities. The relevant coefficients remain qualitatively unchanged, 
significant, and of roughly the same magnitude. Based on the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), we keep the unweighted model as a benchmark.  
LM tests of models (1) and (2) indicate spatial dependency. We thus estimate an error 
correction model using a maximum likelihood estimator with a contiguity weights matrix 
which, however, does not change the qualitative implications. Generally, the pattern of results 
remains almost unchanged throughout models (1) to (4) with the exception of market 
potential, which loses statistical significance in (3). The magnitude of the coefficient point 
estimates is similar in the OLS and SAR models. If spatially weighted employment variables 
are used (4), the lambda coefficient even becomes insignificant. Problems of spatial 
dependency are of relatively little concern.  
The results proved to be robust if  
- the impact of the manufacturing of consumer durables and capital goods and interest-
insensitive services is investigated at sub-sector level, or 
- the specifications were re-estimated employing a binary choice model or,  
 - the minimum distance to the three major gateway cities of Stockholm (ferry terminal, 
airport), Gothenburg (ferry terminal), and Malmoe (Oeresund-bridge) is used as an 
alternative to the market potential measure.  
IV. Conclusion 
Our results provide new evidence on the heterogeneous effects of a common monetary 
policy and analyze the notion that the industrial mix is an important driving force behind the 
regionally heterogeneous transmission. We show that voters in regions with interest-sensitive 
industries did not expect to gain from joining the currency, although the influence of the 
industrial structure is of subordinated importance.  
 Figure 1. Spatial distribution of “no-votes” against the EURO in Sweden, 2003a 
  
a Own illustration. Figure is stylized to save space. 
 
 Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum 
      Deviation Value* Value** 
Market potential (10 Mio SEK) 270.62 267.36 168.67 11.76 757.47 
Average age (years) 41.38 41.57 2.22 35.77 46.33 
Unemployment rate (%) 5.59 5.28 2.00 2.04 14.62 
NO-Parties (%) 16.79 16.65 4.56 6.24 32.50 
Construction (%) 11.73 11.30 4.53 1.31 28.07 
Manufactures (%) 13.44 9.47 12.14 0.00 64.06 
Services G50-52 (%) 23.87 23.41 7.12 2.90 48.81 
Services I60-62 (%) 10.52 9.16 7.22 0.00 46.48 
Other services (%) 25.82 24.92 12.29 3.16 75.98 
 	 	 	 	 	* truncated at 5% 
	 	 	 	 	** truncated at 95% 
 
 
 
	 	 	 	 		
Table 2. Determinants of the share of no-votes in Swedish referendum on EMU-membership, 
2003a 
 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
SAR 
(4) 
SAR 
Distance to ECB [km] 0.007** 0.007** 0.009** 0.007** 
 0.204 0.204 0.252 0.204 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) -0.001 
 
Market Potential [1 Mio SEK] -1.78e-05** -1.44e-05** -8.41e-06 -1.44e-05*** 
 -0.270 -0.218 -0.127 -0.218 
 (2.87e-06) (3.19e-06) (8.22e-06) (3.12e-06) 
 
Border [dummy] -4.304** -4.373** -3.119** -4.372** 
 -0.171 -0.174 -0.124 -0.174 
 (0.697) (0.731) (0.911) (0.750) 
 
Urban [dummy] -5.021** -3.888** -5.678** -3.888** 
 -0.146 -0.113 -0.165 -0.113 
 (1.369) (1.453) (1.721) (1.424) 
 
Average age [years] 0.853** 0.544** 1.073** 0.544* 
 0.172 0.11 0.217 0.11 
 (0.169) (0.206) (0.116) (0.219) 
 
Unemployment rate [%] -0.023 0.001 0.187 0.001 
 -0.004 0.000 0.034 0.000 
 (0.183) (0.187) (0.177) (0.181) 
 
No-Parties [%] 0.733** 0.773** 0.638** 0.773** 
 0.303 0.320 0.264 0.320 
 (0.095) (0.097) (0.092) (0.095) 
 
Construction [%] 0.162** 0.266* 0.143* 0.266* 
 0.067 0,009 0.059 0.009 
 (0.061) (0.117) (0.062) (0.114) 
  
Manufact. Durables [%] 0.014 -0.025 0.030 -0.025 
 0.015 -0.030 0.033 -0.030 
 (0.023) (0.038) (0.023) (0.038) 
 
Services G50-52 [%] -0.085* 0.064 0.030 0.064 
 -0.055 0.024 0.019 0.024 
 (0.046) (0.061) (0.044) (0.063) 
 
Services I60-62 [%] -0.054 0.074 -0.010 0.074 
 -0.030 0.022 -0.006 0.022 
 (0.057) (0.112) (0.053) (0.111) 
 
Other services [%] 
 
-0.134** 
 
-0.223** 
 
-0.112** 
 
-0.223** 
 -0.192 -0.221 -0.160 -0.221 
 (0.029) (0.055) (0.027) (0.053) 
 
Constant 14.855* 29.627** 0.003 29.609** 
 1.349 2.691 0.000 2.690 
 (7.442) (8.894) (0.422) (10.238) 
 
Lambda   0.134*** 2.77e-05 
   (0.032) (0.006) 
Sector employment Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
Observations 288 288 288 288 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.856 0.845 0.843 0.845 
Mean VIF 1.81 2.13 1.81 2.13 
AIC 1666.119 1687.002 1642.190 1691.002 
a Figures in first lines are unstandardized estimates, numbers in second lines and in italics beta-coefficients. The standard 
errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity in (1) and (2) and are corrected for spatial dependency in (3) and 
(4). The sector variables represent the share of sector employment at total employment within municipalities in (1) and (3) 
and the same for spatially weighted employment as in equation (10) in (2) and (4).* / ** / *** denote significance at the 
10, 5 and 1% level. 
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